


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The UK's role in Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Export and Trade

Dr Mel Draper



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Nuclear weapons: Can they be stopped?

By Paul Reynolds

BBC News Online world affairs correspondent

Nuclear technology is now so widespread that it is only political will which stops many countries from making nuclear weapons.

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N Korea 'won't stop nuclear plan'

A senior North Korean official has said the North does not intend to abandon its nuclear programme when it returns to talks on the subject, reports say.

Deputy foreign minister Kang Sok-ju said the North had not tested a nuclear weapon last month to then get rid of them, according to Japanese media.





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Iran defiant on nuclear programme

Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has rejected international calls for Tehran to suspend uranium enrichment, a day before a UN deadline runs out.

He said Iran would only do so if states seeking the suspension stopped producing nuclear fuel themselves.



Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says the UN cannot set pre-conditions for talks

Methods of Control

- Safeguards
- Trade Controls
- Physical Protection

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Key Articles are:

- I Nuclear Weapons State not to transfer weapons to Non-Nuclear Weapon States
- II Non-nuclear Weapon States not to receive, manufacture, or accept assistance for, nuclear weapons
- III Safeguards to apply to all special fissionable materials
- IV Peaceful uses
- VI Disarmament

Safeguards

- What are they?
- How are they applied?

Safeguards in UK

- UK is Nuclear Weapon State, therefore voluntary
- Also a member of Europe - so come under the Euratom Treaty
- Apply to maximum extent possible
- Subject to both IAEA and European Commission Inspections
- Publish extensive data on our holdings and changes of nuclear material
- Work with IAEA to strengthen and extend safeguards

Additional Protocol

- Additional to Comprehensive Safeguards
- Requires reporting of specific activities and transfers not involving nuclear material
- Helps IAEA to identify if there is any clandestine developments
- Not all states have yet signed up

Export Control

- NPT Art I and II
- Zangger & Nuclear Suppliers Groups
- Trigger List
- Implement through Export Licensing

Nuclear Security

- Physical Protection of sites holding nuclear material
- Movements, information and people
- Guidelines set by IAEA
- Responsibility of OCNS in UK

Where are the Weaknesses?

- Controls over the "sensitive" parts of the nuclear fuel cycle
- Unsecured nuclear material in some states
- Nuclear terrorism
- Withdrawal from NPT

Implications for New Build

- International Safeguards, Export Control exist, are robust but need political support and continuous development.
- Security in UK is well developed and conforms to or exceeds international standards
- Any new build will conform to these standards, exchanges of information and materials will be licensed and all will be open to inspection by the IAEA and EC.
- UK not alone in considering new build